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A. INTRODUCTION
No rule, whether customary or conventional, can remain unaffected by time, and thus it is important to
consider the impact of the passage of time on the interpretation or application of the norms of public
international law.' The intertemporal principle, or intertemporal law, provide rules which determine
the successive legal systems applicable in a particular case.2
In fact, the legal issues most sensitive to the passage of time, or the question of whether to
apply old rules or present norms of international law, are treaty interpretations or questions of title to
territory or maritime entitlements, since they often relate to matters in the distant past where different
norms prevailed.3 International judicial practice has also proved this point. As will be outlined below,
almost all of the international judicial cases that contain the application of the intertemporal principle
are either related to treaty interpretation, or territory title as well as maritime entitlements.
However, whether related to treaty interpretation, or concerning territory title as well as
maritime entitlements, the application of the intertemporal principle follows the same logic. For the
avoidance of doubt, it is necessary to first discuss the nature of the application of the intertemporal
principle. The intertemporal principle is concerned with the relationship between law and facts, or in
other words, between a legal norm and an action or a factual state of affairs.' In practice, usually there
exist several and different actions and states of affairs at different points in time. In case of the
occurrence of different and successive legal rules, and in order to determine which rules will prevail
and apply to certain actions or states of affairs, there comes the matter of the application of the
intertemporal principle.
Among the facts, there is a specific kind called "institutional facts". This type relies on "the
interpretation of things, events, and pieces of behaviour" by reference to certain legal normative
* PhD candidate, the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University.
1 Y Tanaka, "Reflections on Time Elements in the International Law of the Environment" (2013) 73 ZaoRV 140.
2 Islands of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), (1928) Reports of International Arbitral Awards 845-846
(henceforth Islands of Palmas case).
3 A D'Amato, "International Law, Intertemporal Problems" (1992) Encyclopedia of Public International Law
1234.
' U Linderfalk, "The application of international legal norms over time: the second branch of international law"
(2011) 58 Netherlands International Law Review 154.
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frameworks.' It is through the interpretation of such things and their use in the light of the relevant
applicable rules that makes such things have the meaning they have.' One typical category of
"institutional facts" is treaty provisions. Though the texts of such treaty provisions may stay
unchanged, their meanings are subject to the applicable legal rules under which they are interpreted.
Likewise, in the event of successive legal rules, the intertemporal principle will apply here through the
method of determining which legal rule should be chosen to confer the legal meanings of such treaty
provisions. In other words, the so-called intertemporal interpretation of treaties is indeed also a
problem of the application of the intertemporal principle.7
Given its relationship to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS")
and certain island territorial disputes as well as maritime entitlement disputes, the South China Sea
dispute must take into account the intertemporal principle. Especially with respect to the maritime
entitlement dispute, there is a prevailing opinion that UNCLOS is the sole source of maritime
entitlement, rights and obligations.' However, some scholars, especially Chinese scholars, argue that
UNCLOS does not necessarily supersede the rules and principles of general international law existing
before UNCLOS, which instead can be regarded as supplementing what is provided for in UNCLOS.9
UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, and as "one of the most important law-making events in
this field",'o especially in relation to the maritime entitlements system, this convention "creates a
number of new maritime zones that did not exist prior to the start of negotiations"," including the
concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, the disputants of the South China Sea
dispute, namely China (People's Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of China (ROC)) (at least
since 1958),12 Vietnam (at least since 1977),13 the Philippines (at least since 1974),"1 Malaysia (at least
since 1979),15 and Brunei Darussalam (at least since 1993),16 had already asserted their claims over the
waters within the South China Sea area before UNCLOS came into effect. Hence, there comes the
question that before UNCLOS, what kind of rules were applicable here, and further, after UNCLOS
entered into force, whether UNCLOS or the pre-UNCLOS legal regimes should prevail in order to
determine the validity of the claims asserted by the disputants. The latter constitutes the intertemporal
problem in the South China Sea dispute.
5 N MacCormick, Institutions ofLaw: An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) 11.
6 Ibid at 12.
7 D'Amato (n 3).
Transcript dated 7th July 2015 of Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No 2013-19, 27 line 26
-28 line 1.
9 Z Gao and B Jia, "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications" (2013) 107
AJIL at 99, 123.
10 J Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development ofInternational Law (2011) 23.
" Ibid at 49.
12 Article 1 of the 1958 PRC Declaration on China's Territorial Sea stipulates that: "The breadth of the territorial
sea of the People's Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of
the People's Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its
surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are separated from the
mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas". Article 4 of the Declaration includes the Paracel Islands and
Spratly Islands.
13 Article 3 of Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977 states that: "The exclusive economic zone of the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam is adjacent to the Vietnamese territory sea and forms with it a 200-nautical-mile zone from the baseline
used to measure the breadth of Viet Nam's territorial sea". This 200-nautical-mile zone overlaps with the South
China Sea water area.
14 In 1956, Tomas Cloma, a Filipino, asserted ownership of thirty-three islands and reefs and fishing grounds,
which was later called Kalayaan, which includes part of the South China Sea area. In 1974, Cloma transferred
Kalayaan to the Republic of the Philippines by "Deed of Assignment Waiver of Rights".
15 Malaysia published a map titled "territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries" on 21 December 1979,
which included part of the water area in the South China Sea.
16 Brunei is reported to claim the marine area around Louisa Reef. See Statement of the Foreign Minister of
Brunei, dated January 1993.
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Therefore, the intertemporal problem demonstrated here is whether UNCLOS supersedes the
previous legal order governing the disputed areas during the pre-UNCLOS period. In order to solve
this problem, this article will conduct a detailed investigation into relevant international judicial
practice. It is worthwhile to note that since treaty interpretation follows the logic of the application of
the intertemporal principle, the cases related to treaty interpretation are also analysed and discussed in
this article. In the first part of this article, an overview of relevant international judicial practice is
introduced. The second part analyses the legal techniques adopted for the evolutionary approach in
relevant cases. The third part discusses how to identify the common consent by the parties. In the end,
based on the aforesaid analysis about the intertemporal principle, it discusses the implications of this
for the South China Sea dispute.
B. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE
While there exist many international judicial cases regarding the intertemporal principle, they seem to
have bifurcate positions. In some cases the courts tend to stick to legal stability and apply the rules of
law that are contemporaneous with the relevant acts or facts, i.e. contemporaneous approach, while in
other cases the evolution and development of the laws are underlined, i.e. evolutionary approach. The
reason for this may be well stated as any solution of an intertemporal problem in the international field
must take account of the dual requirement of development and stability." Nevertheless, before delving
deeper into a detailed investigation of the legal techniques utilised by the international courts to make
the aforesaid bifurcate determinations, it is sensible to better equip ourselves through having an
overview about the relevant international judicial practice.
In terms of the international judicial practice, the intertemporal principle was affirmed, more
precisely shaped and further developed in the famous Islands of Palmas case in 1928.1' It was outlined
by Arbitrator Huber that "[a] juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary
with it, and not of the law in force at the time when the dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be
settled." 9 This is regarded as the first branch of Huber's approach, which position had also been
adopted by some international judicial cases before 1928. However, Huber extended this principle by
adding the second branch as below:
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is to
be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be made
between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects
the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the
existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions
required by the evolution of law. 20
While the first branch seems to follow the contemporaneous approach, the second branch refers to the
equivalent importance of paying attention to changes and evolutions of laws. It seems that Mr. Huber
tried to apply a balancing approach in that regard, satisfying the dual requirement of development and
stability at the same time.
Despite the aforesaid delicate argumentation, Huber's approach has not been generally
accepted, neither does it give a final answer to the problem of the intertemporal principle. The cause
for this may be the unique and special laws-facts structure that this case has. As is stated above, the
" See para 3 of the preamble of the Wiesbaden resolution entitled "The Intertemporal Problem in Public
International Law", adopted by the Institut de droit international on 11 August 1975, available at www.idi-
iil.org.
18 M Kotzur, "Intertemporal Law" in Max Planck Encyclopedia ofPublic International Law para 6.
19 Islands ofPalmas case (n 2) at 845.
2 0 Ibid.
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intertemporal principle concerns the relationship between laws and facts. In this case, both the laws
and facts evolve and change over time. Thus for the previous fact (Fact I), the contemporary rule (Rule
I) applies, while for the current fact (Fact II), the current rule (Rule II) applies. And it is noted that the
difference between the contemporaneous approach and the evolutionary approach is simply based on
which rule applies. For example, if Rule I applies here, then it follows the contemporaneous approach.
Otherwise, if Rule II applies here, then it follows the evolutionary approach.
However, not all the cases have this kind of laws-facts structure. In reality, for most of the
cases, especially those related to treaty interpretation, the facts stay unchanged while the laws evolve.
For this kind of situation, it is hard to drop the conclusion rashly, without any reasoning, that the
subsequent legal regime will supersede the title crystallised through the facts in light of the previous
legal regime. Therefore, when we observe other international judicial practice, it can be seen that the
competition between the contemporaneous approach and the evolutionary approach still exists, and
makes the international judicial practice develop in bifurcate directions.
Moreover, even in a case that has the same kind of laws-facts structure as the Islands of
Palmas case, the court sometimes reaches a different conclusion. For example, in the Grisbadarna
case, the tribunal found that the principle of drawing a median line midway between inhabited lands
did not find sufficient support in the law of nations in force in the 17 th century, and only resort to the
principles of the law prevailing in the 1 7th century, rather than at the present time, will reach a just and
lawful determination of the boundary. The tribunal further stated that "it is a well established principle
of the law of nations that the state of things that actually exists and has existed for a long time should
be changed as little as possible". Thus the same rule should also be applied at the present time. 21 In
other words, the tribunal held that the previous rule should prevail both in the past and at present (i.e.
the time when the case was being decided).
With respect to the contemporaneous approach, cases of interest include the 1909
Grisbadarna case, the 1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case,22 the 1951 Petroleum Development
Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi case,23 the 1971 South West Africa case (the dissenting opinion of Judge
Fitzmaurice), 24 the 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (the dissenting opinion of Judge M De
Castro), 25 and the 1989 Case concerning the delimitation of maritime boundary between Guinea-
Bissau and Senegal.26
On the other hand, as regards the cases supporting the evolutionary approach, they include the
1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case (the dissenting opinion of Dr Luis M Drago), 27 the 1971
21 Grisbadarna case, Norway v Sweden, Award of the Tribunal, The Hague, 23 October 1909 4-6.
22 In this case, the tribunal refused to take cognizance of the connection of other principles concerning the
territorial sovereignty over bays, such as ten mile or twelve mile limits of exclusion based on international acts
subsequent to the treaty of 1818. See North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case (Great Britain, United States) 7
September 1910 Volume XI 196.
23 In this case, the arbitrator held that the grant of a mineral oil concession in 1939 was not to be understood as
including the continental shelf that did not come into existence until 1945. See Petroleum Development Ltd v
Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi case, (September 1951) International Law Reports 144 & 152.
24 In this case, Judge Fitzmaurice held that his reading of the situation was based on what appears to have been
the intentions of those concerned at the time. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, ICJ Reports 1971, 223 (henceforth South West Africa case).
25 In this case, Judge M De Castro held that however general may be the terms in which an agreement is
conceived, it includes only the things on which it appears that the parties proposed to contract. See Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), Dissenting Opinion of Judge M De Castro, ICJ Reports 1978 62-71.
26 In this case, the tribunal refused to interpret the Treaty of 1960 with the legal rules of exclusive economic zone
that did not exist at that time. See Case concerning the arbitral award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v
Senegal), Volume XX, 212.
27 In this case, Dr Luis M Drago held that it would be more justified to interpret the Treaty of 1818 with those
rules immediately following practice. See the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case (n 22) at 208-209.
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South West Africa case,28 the 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case,2 9 the 1997 GabCikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) case,30 the 2007 Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and
Montenegro) case (the joint declaration by Judge Shi and Judge Koroma),3 1 and the 2009 Dispute
regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) case.32
C. LEGAL TECHNIQUES ADOPTED FOR EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
One may find it quite easy to understand the contemporaneous approach to the intertemporal principle,
for "it is well-settled in international customary law that the legal significance of any subjective right
or objective rule is governed by the legal standards valid at the time of its enactment". This notion is
also sometimes qualified as a theory, or as a principle or a doctrine, and, supported by a comparison of
domestic legal systems. It amounts to a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations under
Art 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.33
Especially for the interpretation of treaties, the principle of contemporaneity, or the doctrine of
contemporanea expositio, is emphasized in some international judicial cases, like the North Atlantic
Coast Fisheries case of 1910,34 the United States Nationals in Morocco case of 1952,35 and the Right
of Passage over Indian Territory case of 1960.36 It was also stated by Fitzmaurice in the 1950s that
"[t]he terms of a treaty must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, or which
would have been attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at the time when the
treaty was originally concluded." 37
Although the principle of contemporaneity is not explicitly stated in Article 31 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"), which states that "a treaty should be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty",
according to Brownlie, the principle of contemporaneity is a corollary of Article 31 VCLT.38
Furthermore, the default status of the contemporaneous approach of the intertemporal
principle also gains support from the 1975 Wiesbaden resolution by the Institute of International Law.
It states that:
28 In this case, the court stated clearly that an international instrument had to be interpreted and applied within
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation. See South West Africa case,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971 31.
29 In this case, the court held that the meaning of a word of generic kind was intended to follow the evolution of
the law. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, Judgment, ICJ Report 1978 32-33.
30 In this case, the court held that the treaty provision was not static, and was open to adapt to emerging norms of
international law. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997 67-69.
31 In this case, Judge Shi and Judge Koroma both emphasized that the interpretation of a treaty's provisions
cannot be divorced from developments in the law subsequent to its adoption. See Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and
Montenegro), Joint Declaration by Judge Shi and Judge Koroma, ICJ Reports 2007 280.
32 In this case, the court held that where the parties had used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily had
been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time. See Dispute regarding Navigational
and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009 243.
33 M Kotzur (n 18) para 5.
3' The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case (n 22) at 196.
3' Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America),
Judgment of 27 August 1952, ICJ Reports 1952 176, and 189.
36 Right ofPassage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960 4 and
37.
37 G Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation
and Other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 BYIL 212.
381 Brownlie, Principles ofPublic International Law, 7th edn (2008) 633.
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Unless otherwise indicated, the temporal sphere of application of any norm of public
international law shall be determined in accordance with the general principle of law by which
any fact, action or situation must be assessed in the light of the rules of law that are
contemporaneous with it.39
Hence, in order to refute the default status of the contemporaneous approach to the intertemporal
principle, and to support the evolutionary approach, international courts have to develop some legal
reasoning techniques. With the detailed investigation into relevant international judicial practice, it can
be seen that two legal techniques have been utilized by the international courts, one through the
evolutionary nature of generic terms, and the other through the interpretation or amendment functions
by subsequent practice.
(1) Through the Evolutionary Nature of a Generic Term
With respect to the definition of "a generic term", to begin with, it is unavoidable to refer to the
statement by Judge Higgins in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, which stated that a generic term is a
known legal term.40 In the same case, Judge Weeramantry also stated that intertemporal principles may
apply in the cases of interpreting or applying a legal concept." Hence, the first element that the
definition of"a generic term" may include is that it shall be a known legal term or a legal concept.
Furthermore, in the same case, Judge Oda emphasized the general nature of the legal terms,
which may constitute the second element of the definition. According to his opinion, the criteria for
determining the "main channel" as a general term could be settled by law, while on the other hand, the
determination of the "main channel" in any specific geographical situation is far from being a legal
function.42 Also, in Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) in
2009, when using the concept of generic term, the court said it referred to a class of activity.4 3
Hence, once a term or a concept generates the aforesaid two elements, it could have the legal
effect that its content that the parties expected would change through time," or which could be
considered to give "mobile reference" to the law which will subsequently evolve with time.45 In other
words, as long as a term or a concept is identified as a generic term, people can reasonably expect its
content and meaning to change with the evolvement of time. This opinion also finds support in 1971
South West Africa case,' 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case,4 7 as well as 1998 United States -
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products case.48
Then it is important to figure out what the court relies on to support the evolutionary nature of
a generic term. In this regard, it is notable that the judgment in Dispute regarding Navigational and
Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) relies on the parties' "presumed" intention at the time the
treaty was concluded.49
39 "The Intertemporal Problem" (n 17) para 1.
40 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswanal/Namibia), Declaration of Judge Higgins, ICJ Reports
1999 1114.
41 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswanal/Namibia), Dissenting opinion of Vice-President
Weeramantry, ICJ Reports 1999 1162.
42 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswanal/Namibia), Separate opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ Reports
1999 1118-1119.
4 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (n 32) at 243.
Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswanal/Namibia), Judgement, ICJ Reports 1999 1114.
Tanaka (n 1) at 150.
46 South West Africa case (n 24) at 31.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (n 29) at 32-33.
4 Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS58, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Product,
Doc WT/DS58/AB/R, 12.10.1998 48 at para 130.
49 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (n 32) at 243.
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This position is also found in other relevant cases. For example, in the 1971 South West Africa
case, the court held that the parties to the Covenant must consequently "be deemed to have accepted"
that the concept of "sacred trust" is itself by definition evolutionary. 5o Also, in the 1978 Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf case, the court held that the "presumption" necessarily arose that the meaning of the
expression "the territorial status of Greece" was "intended" to follow the evolution of the law and to
correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at any given time." The
same opinion was expressed in the 1997 GabdJikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) case,
where the court held that by inserting these evolving provisions in the Treaty, the parties "recognized"
the potential necessity to adapt the Project.5 2
Therefore, according to the aforesaid international judicial practice, the evolutionary nature of
a generic term is based on and supported by the "presumed" intention of the parties at the time the
treaty was concluded.
(2) Through the Interpretation or Amendment Functions of Subsequent Practice
The subsequent practice may establish the parties' agreement to the treaty's interpretation, by
shedding light on their original intentions, or it may be at variance with the provisions of the treaty,
showing disregard for the natural and ordinary meaning of its terms.53 Therefore, with respect to the
evolutionary interpretation or application, subsequent practice may play two different functions:
interpretation and amendment.
With respect to the relationship with the evolutionary approach, it is easy to understand that
the amendment function of subsequent practice can be related to the adoption of the evolution of laws,
because the new rights and obligations developed from the subsequent practice may supersede the old
rules. However, the interpretation function of subsequent practice can also affect the content of the old
rules. There are two reasons lending credence to this position. Firstly, the interpretation function of
subsequent practice can only be achieved when the ordinary meaning of the words used in the treaty is
not sufficiently clear, or there is ambiguity." Secondly, under the circumstance that it is applicable
only when there exists ambiguity, the interpretation function of subsequent practice, in fact, refers to
the materialisation works done by the subsequent practice to the old rules that are in relatively broad
formulation. This is achieved by adding some content, introducing systematic order and precision, or
removing the uncertainty and obscurities on a more specific level." To some extent, the specification
and clarification made by the interpretation function of subsequent practice for old rules with some
ambiguity, in fact, add new content to such old rules, and thus substantially affect their meaning when
the ambiguity is replaced by the clearness. Hence, the interpretation function of subsequent practice
can also indicate the evolutionary approach of the intertemporal principle.
(a) The Interpretation Function ofSubsequent Practice
The VCLT establishes in its Articles 31-33 a system of treaty interpretation. Article 31, paragraph 3 of
the VCLT, which reflects customary law, provides as follows:
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
50 South West Africa case (n 24) at 31.
5 1Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (n 29) at 32-33.
52 Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (n 30) at 68-69.
13 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswanal/Namibia), Dissenting opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren,
ICJ Reports 1999 1212-1213.
" This position is supported by Judge Weeramantry in 1999 Kasikili/Sedudu Island case. See Case concerning
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswanal/Namibia) (n 41) at 1162. Also see Competence of the ILO in regard to
International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, (Advisory Opinion),
1922 PCIJ Series B, B03 39.
" H Lauterpacht, "Codification and Development of International Law" (1955) 49 AJIL 20-22.
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(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation;
With respect to the "subsequent agreement" as referred to in subparagraph (a) of this provision, the
International Law Commission commented that an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision
reached after the conclusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which
must be read into the treaty for the purposes of its interpretation. 5 6
In relation to the "subsequent practice" as referred to in subparagraph (b) of this provision, in
the same commentary, the Commission also emphasised the importance of such subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty as an element of interpretation, for it constituted objective evidence of the
understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty.
There are many cases where the court has frequently examined the subsequent practice of the
parties in the application of a treaty, such as in 1960 in Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on
23 December 1906 case,58 in 1962 in the Temple of Preah Vihear case,59 also in 1962 in the Certain
Expenses of the United Nations case6 in 1984 in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua case,' in 1994 in the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyal Chad) case,62 and in
1996 in the Legality of the Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case.63
In a case from the Permanent Court of International Justice, i.e. Competence of the ILO in
Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture
case,6 4 it was also held that if there were any ambiguity, the court might consider the action which had
been taken under the Treaty for the purpose of arriving at the true meaning.
Hence, as it is concluded by the International Law Commission, the probative value of
subsequent practice is well recognized, because it shows how the intention of the parties has been put
into effect.65
(b) The Modification Function of Subsequent Practice
If the interpretation adopted by the parties diverges from the natural and ordinary meaning of the
terms, then this constitutes the amendment of a treaty by subsequent practice. 6 In addition, according
to the opinion of the International Law Commission, the process of amendment through subsequent
practice is obviously an aspect of intertemporal law. 67
56 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966) Vol 11221 para 14.
5 7Ibid at para 15.
58 Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1960 206-207.
59 Case concerning Temple ofPreah Vihear (Merits), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962 33-35.
60 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 1962 157, 160-161 and 172-175.
61 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984 408-413 paras 36-47.
62 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arah Jamahiriyal Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, 34-37 paras 66-71.
63 Legality of the Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 (I)
75 para 19.
64 Competence of the ILO in regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons
Employed in Agriculture (n 54) 39.
65 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1964) Vol II 59.
66 Ibid at 60.
67 Ibid.
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The 1962 Temple of Preah Vihear case is an example of this. In the case, the boundary line
acted on in practice was not reconcilable with the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms of the
treaty, and the effect of the subsequent practice was to amend the treaty.68 The same opinion was also
expressed in the 1963 Interpretation of the Air Transport Services Agreement between the United
States ofAmerica and France case.69
With respect to the legal basis for the legal effect of modification by subsequent practice, it
lies also on the acceptance or consent of the parties. It was stated in the 1962 Temple ofPreah Vihear
case:
Even if there were any doubt as to Siam's acceptance of the map in 1908, and hence of the
frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider, in the light of the subsequent course of
events, that Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it.
She has, for fifty years, enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only
the benefit of a stable frontier. France, and through her Cambodia, relied on Thailand's
acceptance of the map. Since neither side can plead error, it is immaterial whether or not this
reliance was based on a belief that the map was correct. It is not now open to Thailand, while
continuing to claim and enjoy the benefits of the settlement, to deny that she was ever a
consenting party to it.7 0
D. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON CONSENT BY THE PARTIES
Based on the aforesaid analysis about the two legal techniques adopted for the evolutionary approach,
it can be concluded that whether through the evolutionary nature of a generic term, or through the
interpretation or amendment functions by subsequent practice, they both resort to the presumed
intention of the parties.
This position has been neatly encapsulated by Waldock: "the question whether the terms used
[in a treaty] were intended to have a fixed content or to change in meaning with the evolution of the
law could be decided only by interpreting the intention of the parties." 7 ' It also gains support from the
1975 Wiesbaden resolution by the Institute of International Law: "States and other subjects of
international law shall, however, have the power to determine by common consent the temporal sphere
of application of norms."72
However, in most cases, the parties do not specify whether their common intention at the time
was to fix the meaning of a particular term or whether they accepted that the meaning could evolve
and expand over time. 73 Hence, it requires the identification of the common intention of the parties.
The aforesaid two legal techniques do provide an easy and efficient way to determine the
presumed intention of the parties. By identifying the generic nature of relevant terms, the parties will
be assumed to admit its evolutionary nature. Similarly, if some consent or intention is deducted from
the subsequent practice, it will be assumed to cast influence on the relevant old rules. Nevertheless,
these techniques have received severe criticism from Martin Dawidowicz. He comments that the
court's approach in the 2009 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v
Nicaragua) case, as well as its earlier jurisprudence, are compounded by a rather mechanical test to
determine the evolutionary character, and may be considered perfunctory insofar as it does not appear
68 Case concerning Temple ofPreah Vihear (Merits) (n 59) at 32-33.
69 Interpretation of the air transport services agreement between the United States of America and France,
Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 22 December 1963, Volume XVI 62-63, 68.
7o Case concerning Temple ofPreah Vihear (Merits) (n 59) at 32.
71 H Waldock, "Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties" (1966) 1 YILC at 199 para 9.
72 "The Intertemporal Problem in Public International Law" (n 17) at para 3.
73 M Dawidowicz, "The Effect of the Passage of Time on the Interpretation of Treaties: Some Reflections on
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua" (2011) 24 Leiden Journal ofInternational Law 207.
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to take full account of the actual common intention of the parties," which is recognized by the court in
a well-established basic principle to be the main task in the work of interpretation. In other words, he
holds that the presumed intention deducted from the aforesaid two legal techniques adopted by the
court may be different from the common consent by the parties.
Then the problem is how to identify the common intention of the parties. According to
Jennings and Watts, the contemporaneous meaning of a term must provide at least the starting point of
arriving at the proper interpretation.7 6 Likewise, in the 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, Judge
M De Castro held in his dissenting opinion that the meaning of the words may change with time, and
in order to interpret any statement, to ascertain its real meaning, we must first of all concentrate on the
meaning that it could have had at the time when it was made.77 In the 1997 GabCikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia) case, Judge Bedjaoui stated that the ordinary meaning of a treaty term
must in the first place be interpreted according to the contemporaneous meaning of that term. 8 This
approach was also supported by Judge Skotnikov 79 and Judge ad hoc Guillaumeso in the 2009 Dispute
regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) case.
Furthermore, after starting from the contemporaneous approach, concrete evidence of the
parties' intentions shall be taken into account before confirming or rebutting an interpretative
presumption." With respect to the concrete evidence, according to the observation by the International
Law Commission, a safe guide to a decision on the matter of the intertemporal principle may not be
found in the imputed intention of the parties alone. Rather, the interpreter must find concrete evidence
of the parties' intentions in this regard in the material sources referred to in articles 31 and 32 of
VCLT, namely: in the terms themselves; the context; the object and purpose of the treaty; and where
necessary, the trauvaux.8 2
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
With respect to the South China Sea dispute, there are two main issues. One involves the island
sovereignty claims, and the other is related to the maritime entitlements claims. UNCLOS does not
govern the issues of island sovereignty, but does govern the issue of maritime entitlements.
Furthermore, according to the national legislations regarding the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf, as well as the exchanges of notes verbales following the joint submission of
Malaysia and Vietnam in May 2009, with respect to their maritime entitlement claims within the South
China Sea area, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei all rely on UNCLOS. However, in its
initial response to Malaysia and Vietnam, China attached a map depicting the U-shaped line, which
showed that China may intend to assert its maritime entitlements in this area based on other
international law sources than UNCLOS.
Actually, China has never given any official explanation or clarification about the legal basis
of its maritime entitlements, especially those possible claims generated by the U-shaped line.
Nevertheless, the opinion expressed by two famous Chinese scholars, Zhiguo Gao and Bingbing Jia
may give us some hints. In their opinion, with regard to the maritime space that the U-shaped line
Ibid at 204.
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (n 32) at para 58.
76 R Jennings and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim 's International Law (1992) 1282.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (n 25) at 63.
GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Separate Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, ICJ Reports 1997,
122 at para 7.
79 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Separate Opinion of Judge
Skotnikov, ICJReports 2009 paras 4-7.
80 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Declaration of Judge ad hoc
Guillaum, ICJReports 2009 paras 15-16.
81 M Dawidowicz (n 73) at 207.
82 Report of the International Law Commission, UN Doc A/60/10 (2005), 219 at para 474.
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surrounds, historic rights provide some foundation, and the legal regime of historic rights, which has
preceded the advent of UNCLOS by many years, has a continuing role to play.83
Hence, setting aside the problem about the validity of the concept of historic rights in
international law, which exceeds the research scope of this article, there exist two different and
subsequent legal regimes, that is, the legal regime of historic rights and the legal regime of UNCLOS.
Besides, China's alleged activities based on the legal regime of historic rights date from before
UNCLOS, and some such rights are claimed to be from time immemorial." Therefore, as regards such
activities, there may exist the intertemporal problem, that is, which legal regime is going to prevail.
For the avoidance of any doubt, one issue needs to be addressed at this point. Though
UNCLOS and historic rights govern the same subject here, i.e. maritime entitlements, the appearance
of UNCLOS does not necessarily supersede the validity of historic rights. The same issue was
discussed in the 1986 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States ofAmerica) case." In this case, the United States asserted that the court should "refrain
from applying the rules of customary international law because they have been 'subsumed' and
'supervened' by those of international treaty law", under the condition that the content of such
customary international law is also the subject of the provisions in those multilateral treaties. 86
However, this assertion was criticised and refuted by the court. It was held by the court that the
operation of the treaty process must not necessarily deprive the customary norm of its separate
applicability. These two sources are distinguishable by reference to the methods of interpretation and
application. It is clear that the customary international law continues to exist and to apply, separately
from international treaty law." Therefore, in the case of the relationship between UNCLOS and
historic rights, though they govern the same subject, the UNCLOS provisions should not necessarily
deprive the applicability of historic rights if they have been proved as valid customary law.
Therefore, according to the aforesaid analysis about the intertemporal principle, if the
subsequent legal regime of UNCLOS prevails, one has to prove that there is a common consent
expressed by the relevant parties. It is because, pursuant to the default status of the contemporaneous
approach of the intertemporal principle, the aforesaid activities shall apply the legal regime
contemporary with such activities, i.e. the legal regime of historic rights. However, in order to refute
such presumption, concrete evidence of the parties' intentions or common consent must be proved. In
this case, relevant terms, the context, the object and purpose, and the trauvaux of the UNCLOS will be
examined separately below.
(1) Relevant Terms
UNCLOS does not mention "historic rights" in its terms, and the term "historic" only appears at three
places. The first place is "historic bays" in Article 10.6. The second is "historic title" in Article 15.
And the third is a cross reference to the aforesaid two in Article 298.1(a)(i).
Therefore, from the terms of UNCLOS, it will be untenable to say that UNCLOS expressly
denies or prohibits the application of the legal regime of historic rights, because there is no express
common consent found in the terms regarding such.
83 Gao & Jia (n 9) at 99, 123.
Ibid.
85 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America),
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8 6 Ibid at para 174.
8 7Ibid at para 175.
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(2) The Context
While UNCLOS is a comprehensive instrument of law, and provides a framework within which most
uses of the seas are located, it was never intended to exhaust international law at the time of its
adoption,8 9 and rules of customary law and other international conventions are, and will continue to be,
of enormous importance in determining the detailed rights and duties of states. 90
This view has been confirmed by the preamble of UNCLOS, which states that "matters not
regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general
international law". 9'
Furthermore, a preamble can play a contextual role in interpretation. The contextual role is
where the preamble assists with confirming the ordinary meaning of relevant terms, and assists with
determining if there is any ambiguity.92 Hence, the preamble can be treated as a context when
interpreting UNCLOS in order to explore the relevant intention of the parties.
Therefore, from the preamble of UNCLOS, for the matters not provided in UNCLOS,
including historic rights, the rules and principles of general international law can be applied without
contradicting the rights and obligations under UNCLOS.
(3) Object and Purpose
UNCLOS, like law in general, has the object of assuring the coexistence of different interests which
are worthy of legal protection. 93 In fact, the determination between the contemporaneous approach and
the evolutionary approach is a balance between the interest of legal stability and the interest of legal
flexibility.94 Both of them deserve protection by law. However, if only one of these two conflicting
interests is to prevail, the determination should follow certain legal process, rather than being made by
discretionary means.
Therefore, when two conflicting interests both comply with the object and purpose of law,
there is no basis to refute the default status of the contemporaneous approach of intertemporal
principle when the common consent of evolutionary approach has not been found both in the terms
and the context of UNCLOS.
(4) The Trauvaux
Reference to the preparatory work of the parties may be made to show the evidence or indication of
the intentions of the parties. 95 In 1958, the study about the "historic bays" was conducted by the
Secretariat of the United Nations, which was intended for the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea. In the final memorandum of this study, it mentioned that "historic rights are also claimed in
respect of straits, estuaries and other similar bodies of water".96
Hence, as we can see from what is quoted, during the drafting of UNCLOS the concept of
historic rights was known to the drafters. However, there was no further discussion on this concept.
89 Gao & Jia (n 9) at 99 and 123.
90 R R Churchill and A V Lowe, the Law of the Sea (1999) 24-25.
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93 Islands ofPalmas case (n 2) at 870.
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Then in 1962, prompted by a resolution on the matter taken by the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea in 1958 at Geneva, General Assembly resolution 1453 (XIV) of 7 December
1959 asked the International Law Commission to extend the study to "historic waters including
historic bays".
In the final report, it discussed a widely held opinion that the regime of historic waters
constitutes an exception to the general rules of international law regarding the delimitation of the
maritime domain of a state. 97 Based on this opinion, when the historic title has not been expressly
reserved in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and
assuming that relevant articles of that Convention have been codified and become general rules of
international law, relevant articles of that Convention must prevail as between the parties to the
Convention.98
However, according to the report, the aforesaid opinion was criticised for there would arise
several difficulties. For example, the so-called general rules would be "general" in the sense only that
they would be more generally applicable than the "exceptional" title to "historic waters". But they
would not be "general" in the sense of having a superior validity in relation to the "exceptional"
historic title. Both the general rules and the historic title would be part of customary international law,
and there would be no grounds for claiming a priori that the historic title is valid only if based on the
recognition or acquiescence of the other states. 9 9
Hence, the report suggested that the realistic view would seem to be not to relate "historic
waters" to such rules as an exception or not an exception, but to consider the title to "historic waters"
independently on its own merits. 00 And there is no reason not to apply this position to the concept of
historic rights.
Therefore, from the aforesaid preparatory work of the parties, when the legal regime of
historic rights is not provided or reserved in UNCLOS, it does not mean that the relevant articles of
UNCLOS shall prevail. In other words, the common consent of the evolutionary approach cannot be
presumed.
To conclude, from the relevant terms, the context, the object and purpose, and the trauvaux of
the UNCLOS, the parties' intentions or common consent in order to refute the contemporaneous
approach of intertemporal principle have not been found. Therefore, the subsequent legal regime of
UNCLOS does not supersede the previous legal regime of historic rights.
F. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The issue about the applicability of law is very important, and the above discussion of the
intertemporal principle deals with its ratione temporis sphere, based on international judicial practice,
and in connection with the reality of South China Sea dispute. The following are concluding remarks
ansing from the content of this article:
1. While there exist many international judicial cases regarding the intertemporal
principle, they seem to have bifurcate positions, i.e. the contemporaneous approach
and the evolutionary approach;
2. The contemporaneous approach of the intertemporal principle has a default status;
97 UN Doc A/CN.4/143, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays - Study Prepared by the
Secretariat, 1962, 7, available at http://.tre&.unorg/ilc/guide/8 4htm.
98 Ibid at 12.
99 Ibid at 10.
100 Ibid.
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3. Two legal techniques have been utilised by the international courts to support the
evolutionary approach, one through the evolutionary nature of generic terms, and the
other through the interpretation or amendment functions by subsequent practice;
4. Both of the aforesaid two legal techniques resort to the presumed intention of the
parties, which has been criticised as different from the common consent or real
intention of the parties;
5. In order to better identify the common intention of the parties, one should start from
the contemporaneous approach, and take into account the concrete evidence such as
the relevant terms, the context, the object and purpose, and the trauvaux;
6. Examining the South China Sea dispute with the aforesaid analysis, it is concluded
that the subsequent legal regime of UNCLOS does not supersede the previous legal
regime of historic rights.
115
